Empirical analyses of parimutuel betting markets have documented that market probabilities of favorites (longshots) tend to underestimate (overestimate) the corresponding empirical probabilities. We argue that this favorite-longshot bias is consistent with bettors taking simultaneous positions on the basis of private information about the likelihood of di¤erent outcomes. The ex post realization of a high market probability indicates favorable information about the occurrence of an outcome-and the opposite for longshots. This explanation for the bias relies on the bettors'inability to incorporate the surprise revealed by the …nal odds.
This paper analyzes the role of private information in parimutuel (also known as pool betting) markets, a method commonly adopted to determine betting odds for horse races and other sporting events. According to the parimutuel system, the amount wagered on all outcomes is redistributed to the bets placed on the winning outcome. Given the frequent observation of the realized outcomes (which are not a¤ected by the market process) and the absence of bookmakers (who could induce biases), parimutuel betting markets o¤er an ideal testbed for theories of information aggregation and market e¢ ciency.
The e¢ cient market hypothesis asserts that the fraction of money wagered by the market on an outcome is an unbiased estimate of the outcome's empirical frequency. Beginning with Richard M. Gri¢ th (1949) , empirical studies have established that market probabilities of favorites (i.e., outcomes with short odds) tend to under-predict their empirical probabilities; conversely, longshots are over-bet and yield lower expected returns at the …nal odds.
1 The favorite-longshot bias (FLB) is perceived as a systematic deviation from the e¢ cient market hypothesis.
In this paper, we argue that one should expect the FLB to result when a large number of privately informed bettors take simultaneous positions just before post time. 2 Our resolution of the FLB is based on the identi…cation of the empirical probability of an outcome with the outcome's posterior probability derived by Bayes rule to incorporate the information revealed by the bets placed in equilibrium. Using the equilibrium structure to compute the Bayesian posterior probability associated with any realized market probability, we show that the ex post realization of a high market probability indicates favorable information about the outcome's likelihood-and the opposite for longshots. The FLB is present because in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium bettors are not allowed to revise their positions to incorporate the surprise revealed by the …nal odds. The bias would instead be eliminated in a rational expectations equilibrium.
Model
To illustrate our argument, we focus on the simplest setting with a binary outcome, k 2 f1; 2g. There are N ex ante identical bettors. To stress that our explanation does not rely on heterogeneity in prior beliefs, we make the conventional assumption that bettors share a common prior belief, q 2 (0; 1), that the realized outcome will be k = 1.
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Each bettor i 2 f1; : : : ; N g privately observes a signal leading to the private belief p i 2 (0; 1) that outcome 1 will be realized. Conditional on k, signals (and therefore private beliefs) are independently and identically distributed across bettors. For convenience, we further assume that each bettor's private belief p is distributed according to a strictly increasing and continuous cumulative distribution G with full support over (0; 1). By
Bayes'rule, the private belief satis…es
Given that the densities satisfy the strict monotone likelihood ratio property, the cumulative distributions are ranked by …rst order stochastic dominance: G (pj1) < G (pj2) for all p 2 (0; 1). Intuitively, higher Bayesian beliefs about outcome 1 are more likely to occur when 1 is the true outcome.
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On the basis of the private belief, each bettor decides the outcome on which to bet a …xed and indivisible amount, normalized to 1. 5 After the realization of outcome k, the total amount of money in the parimutuel pool is divided equally among those who bet on the winning outcome, k. Let b k denote the total amount bet on k. If k is the winning outcome, then every unit bet on k receives the monetary payo¤
All bettors are risk neutral and maximize individually their expected monetary payo¤, conditional on the information available when betting. 6 A bettor's strategy maps every private belief into one of the two possible bets. In equilibrium, every bettor correctly conjectures the opponents'strategies and plays a best response to this conjecture. Given that by construction the game is symmetric with respect to the players, we restrict attention to symmetric equilibria, in which all bettors use the same strategy.
2 Equilibrium
Given the opponents'identical strategy, each bettor can calculate c (ljk), the conditional chance that an opponent bets on outcome l when k is the winning outcome. A bettor's payo¤ conditional on winning is random, because opponents'signals and bets are uncertain.
We consider the game in the limit as the number of players grows, N ! 1, where the law of large numbers guarantees that the uncertainty over the aggregate distribution of signals (and therefore of bets) vanishes. In this limit, a fraction c (kjk) of bets are on the winner when the outcome is k, and thus the expected payment to each bet on k is 1=c (kjk).
By risk neutrality, a bettor with private belief p expects to obtain a payo¤ equal to p=c (1j1) 1 when betting on outcome 1 and (1 p) =c (2j2) 1 when betting on outcome 2. Let p 2 (0; 1) be the unique solution to p=c (1j1) = (1 p) =c (2j2). A bettor with threshold belief p is indi¤erent between betting on either of the two outcomes. Symmetric equilibrium requires p =p, wherep is the threshold belief conjectured for each opponent.
Since c (1j1) = 1 G (pj1) and c (2j2) = G (pj2), the equilibrium threshold belief,p, is the unique solution to
Uniqueness follows from the fact that the left-hand side is strictly increasing in p, while the right-hand side is non-increasing. 6 Our model assumes risk neutrality to avoid confounding our information-based explanation with biases induced by risk preferences. The FLB is also consistent with risk loving preferences (see Martin Weitzman 1965 ). As we argue in Section 4, our theory can rationalize not only the FLB but also the informativeness of the changes in odds close to post time.
7 In a setting with binary signals, Frédéric Koessler, Charles Noussair, and Anthony Ziegelmeyer (2008) note that asymmetric equilibria may also exist when the number of bettors, N , is small. Here, we instead focus on the limit as N ! 1. In addition, equilibrium analysis in our model is simpli…ed by positing continuously distributed signals.
Surprise
To investigate market e¢ ciency, empiricists typically group observations into classes according to their market probabilities, where the market probability of outcome 1 is equal to the fraction of money bet on that outcome, = b 1 =N . For each observation class, empiricists then compute the associated empirical probability as the fraction of races that are won by the horses in the class. When comparing market and empirical probabilities, empiricists typically …nd a systematic di¤erence between these probabilities: when the market probability is large, it is still smaller than the corresponding empirical probability. That is, a favorite is more likely to win than indicated by the market probability. Conversely, market probabilities of longshots over-predict on average their empirical probabilities computed from race outcomes.
Our explanation for the FLB relies on the fact that realized market probabilities contain information about the chance of di¤erent outcomes. Applying Bayes'rule, for any realized market probability we can compute the corresponding posterior probability belief, , that outcome 1 will be realized, incorporating the information contained by the realization of this market probability in equilibrium. The law of large numbers guarantees that the empirical frequency of outcome 1 across a large sample of outcomes is approximately equal to this posterior probability, . This posterior probability incorporates the information revealed in the betting distribution, and thus correctly estimates the outcome's empirical probability.
When exactly b 1 out of N bets are placed on 1, Bayes'rule yields the posterior proba-
using the binomial distribution of bets. We are now ready to compare any given market probability = b 1 =N with the associated posterior probability :
Proposition. In the limit as the number of bettors becomes arbitrarily large, N ! 1, for market probabilities
(respectively, < ), the posterior probability revealed by the bets is 1 (respectively, 0).
Consider the limit as N goes to in…nity, when the realized bets contain full information about the outcome, as they are based on an increasing number of i.i.d. signals. Thus, the right-hand side of (5) tends to zero or in…nity, depending on whether the realized is below or above the switching market probability , as de…ned in (4). Because market bets perfectly reveal the outcome, the posterior probability converges to either zero or one. The result then follows immediately from (5).
According to this result, the FLB results from the surprise generated by the realization of the market probability. For high (or low) market probabilities, the posterior, and thus empirical, probability is higher (or lower) than the market probability. More precisely, whether an outcome is the ex ante favorite or longshot, when su¢ ciently many (or few) bettors choose it, the outcome is revealed to be even more (less) likely than indicated by the market probability.
Intuitively, the observation of one more bet on outcome 1 is good news for outcome 1
. When the fraction of bets placed on outcome 1 is exactly equal to , this piece of news is exactly neutralized by the fact that fraction 1 bet on outcome 2, and the posterior probability is equal to the prior, = q. When the realized market probability is above the switching level , favorable news outweighs unfavorable news for outcome 1-and with a population of in…nite size, this realization reveals that outcome 1 is true with probability 1.
The FLB predicted in this simple setting is clearly extreme. With an in…nite number of bettors with i.i.d. signals, the information contained in the market probability fully reveals outcome k. Thus, the posterior formed after aggregating the information of all the individual bets is equal to either 0 or 1. Posterior probabilities would be bounded Second, the FLB arises in our game-theoretic model (as well as at the real-world racetrack) because bettors are not allowed to condition their behavior on the …nal odds. Indeed, bettors in parimutuel markets take positions before observing the …nal realization of the market odds. As shown above, our Bayes-Nash equilibrium does not converge to a rational expectations equilibrium as the number of players increase. 11 The FLB would instead be eliminated if rational bettors were allowed to revise their positions after the market is closed, as in a rational expectations equilibrium. Note that in our Bayes-Nash equilibrium the FLB arises even though bettors anticipate that the realized bets will be correlated with the likelihood of the outcomes and adjust their behavior in anticipation of this correlation.
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Third, we focus here on the limit with an in…nite number of bettors who are forced to participate-for the FLB to result the number of bettors must be su¢ ciently large. In a more general version of this model, Ottaviani and Sørensen (2007) analyze how the sign and extent of the FLB depend on the number of competing bettors, their willingness to participate, the quality of their private information, the number of outcomes, the divisibility of bets, and asymmetries in prior probabilities. Analyzing the impact of these variables on the signal to noise ratio present in equilibrium delivers a number of testable comparative statics predictions broadly in line with evidence from parimutuel markets (from horse racing to Lotto).
